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THEORIGINAND REGULATION
OF HEALTHRISKt

Carcinogen Regulation:Risk Characteristics
and the Synthetic Risk Bias
By W. KIPViscusi*
Why does the governmentregulate different kinds of risks? Economists usually
trace the motivation for the regulation to
the existence of some form of market failure. In such instances,it will be desirableto
regulate substances for which the benefits
of the regulation exceed the costs, which
will potentiallybe the case if there is some
inadequacyin the market.
The restrictive legislative mandates of
regulatoryagencies in some cases prohibit
basingregulationson a balancingof benefits
and costs, and at the very least, seldom
encouragesuch balancing.1As a result, one
would expect the benefits of regulatoryefforts to play a greater role in regulatory
decisionsthan do the costs.2 This patternis
exemplifiedby the high implicit values per
statistical life that have been observed for
U.S. regulatoryefforts.3 Regulatory agencies consequentlytend to be risk-orientedin
their policy approach.
Whatthis characterizationneglectsis that,
even withinthe contextof emphasizingrisks,
regulatoryagencies may not be makingbalanced decisions. The risk level consists of

tDiscussants: Maureen Cropper, World Bank; Don
Kenkel, Pennsylvania State University; Tyler Cowen,
George Mason University.
*

Department of Economics, Duke University,
Durham, NC 27708-0097. This research was supported
by U.S. EPA Cooperative Agreement CR-817478-03.
Alan Carlin, the contract officer, provided helpful comments, and Jahn Hakes provided superb research assistance.
1See, for example, the discussion in Viscusi (1992).
2This does not mean that costs are unimportant (see
Maureen Cropper et al., 1992).
3For review, see John Morrall (1986) and Viscusi
(1992).
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two principalcomponents,the probabilityof
an adverseoutcome and the numberof people affected.The probabilitydependson the
potency of the exposure, the frequencyof
the exposure,and similarkinds of parameters. Regulatoryagencies are generallyconcerned with the risk, particularlywith respect to the potency of the chemicals. In
contrast, the numberof people exposed to
the risk plays a much less prominentrole in
regulatorydecisions. The standard regulatory policy trigger is typically linked to a
probabilityof an adverse outcome as opposed to an expectedbody count.
The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Superfund program is a case in
point. In that effort,the focus is on the risks
posed by differentpathwaysby which populations could be exposed to the hazard.In
the course of the detailed policy analysis
prepared for each Superfund site, EPA
never assesses the size of the population
exposed to the risk. Moreover,there is not
even an assessmentof the probabilitythat a
future population will be exposed to the
risk.The presence of a riskwith a potential
exposureto a future populationis sufficient
to triggergovernmentaction.
Extrapolation from this experience to
other instances would lead one to expect
that the probabilityof canceror some other
adverse health outcome would be the driving force behind regulatorydecisions.However, even this characterizationmay be
overly broad. In this paper, I will explore
the decision to regulate natural and synthetic chemicals.To what extent are regulatory decisions drivenby the severityof the
risk as opposed to the characterof the risk
exposure? The striking result is that the
risk severityDlavsa very small role. Instead.
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it is whether the chemical is synthetic or
naturalthat is the drivingforce behind regulatorydecisions.
I. The CarcinogenSample

The resultshere will focus on a sampleof
widely publicizedcarcinogensdeveloped by
BruceN. Ames and discussedin Ames et al.
(1990) and in Lois Gold et al. (1992).These
results are similar to those obtained for a
much larger sample of several hundred
chemicalsin a studyby the author.
The particularchemical sample that will
be analyzedconsists of 51 differentchemicals that appear in 80 potential sources,
which I will designate as the Ames 51 and
Ames 80 samples. Many of the potential
chemical exposures are to common natural
products,such as lettuce, basil, brownmustard, celery, and coffee. In addition, there
are exposure to other chemicals such as
Captan,Lindane, and DDT. The chemicals
may appear more than one time in the
listing because they may occur in multiple
products.For example,caffeic acid is a carcinogen contained in lettuce, apples, pears,
coffee, plums, celery, carrots,and potatoes.
For each of these chemicals, Ames
developed indexes of the carcinogenicityof
the chemical. The primary risk measure
of the hazard,which reflects the potency of
the chemical as well as the amount of the
daily human exposure, is the human
exposure/rodent potency index (HERP).
For the chemicalgroup,the highestpossible
HERP index is 140 for exposuresto EDB,
with the lowest being 6xl -O9 for Captan.
Ames has also developed a carcinogenic
potency data base to capture the riskiness
of carcinogensindependentof the extent of
human exposure. The two measures that
will be analyzedin this paper are the TD50
values for rats and mice. The TD50value is
the chronic dose (in mg/kg-day) of the
chemicalwhichcauses half of the rats(mice)
in the sample to develop tumors over the
course of a lifetime. Chemicalswith higher
TD50 values are consequently safer than
those with lower values. The HERP value
calculated for each exposure has been obtained using the more sensitive of the two
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species to calculatethe possible riskimplied
by the chemical exposure. Other risk measures,such as the EPA IRIS data-baseslope
factors,generate similarresults.
The other principal characteristic of
chemicalsthat will be assessed is the extent
to which chemicals that are synthetic (0-1
dummyvariable)are regulatedmore or less
stringently than those that are not. Synthetic chemicalsare subject to the Delaney
Clause in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, so that one would expect syntheticfood
additives to be subject to more stringent
regulation. However, the pattern for synthetic chemicalsproves to be quite general
and is apparentacross differentagencies as
well. If agencies are truly concerned with
the actualrisksposed by the chemicals,they
should not be concerned with their synthetic nature, but instead should focus on
the magnitude of the risk based on the
HERP index or some other measureof potency. An alternativepossibilityis that it is
not simplythe magnitudeof the risk that is
consequential,but also the characterof the
risk.The generalpublic,for example,greatly
overestimatesnovel riskssuch as those associated with synthetic chemicals.To the extent that regulatoryagencies are reflective
of public preferences, one would expect
there to be more stringent regulation of
syntheticchemicals.
II. Patterns of Regulation

Table 1 summarizes the different patterns
of regulation. For the Ames 51 sample, 35
of the chemical exposures are regulated,
and 16 are not. For the Ames 80 sample, 49

exposures are regulated, and 31 are not.
Thus, in each case the sample comprisesa
very large numberof regulatedchemicals.
Table 1 presents information for these

chemicals based on all regulations of the
chemicals as well as those subject to FDA
regulation.In each case, panels A and B of
Table 1 provide information,by regulatory
status of the chemicals,on the averagepercentage of chemicalsthat are syntheticand
the risks associatedwith them. It is particularly striking that the regulated chemicals
are disproportionatelysynthetic. In the
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OF KEY RISK MEASURES,
TABLE 1-SUMMARY
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
(IN PARENTHESES)

Variable

Unregulated

Regulated

0.13
(0.34)
-4.54
(5.26)

0.63
(0.49)
- 6.42
(6.07)

0.29
(0.46)
-4.73
(4.32)

0.88
(0.34)
- 8.24
(7.90)

0.06
(0.25)
-4.94
(4.70)

0.59
(0.50)
- 6.32
(5.50)

0.17
(0.38)
- 5.70
(3.96)

0.77
(0.44)
- 7.60
(8.02)

Nonsynthetic

Synthetic

0.48
(0.51)
-5.11
(4.05)

0.92
(0.28)
-6.64
(7.37)

0.07
(0.27)
-5.11
(4.05)

0.58
(0.50)
- 6.64
(7.37)

0.41
(0.50)
- 5.36
(4.05)

0.94
(0.25)
- 6.45
(6.69)

0.08
(0.28)
- 5.36
(4.05)

0.59
(0.50)
- 7.93
(6.97)

A. Ames 51
All regulations:
Synthetic
ln (HERP index)
FDA regulations:
Synthetic
ln (HERP index)
B. Ames 80
All regulations:
Synthetic
ln(HERP index)
FDA regulations:
Synthetic
ln(HERP index)

Variable
C. Ames 51
All regulations:
Regulated
ln (HERP index)
FDA regulations:
Regulated
ln(HERP index)
D. Ames 80
All regulations:
Regulated
ln(HERP index)
FDA regulations:
Regulated
ln(HERP index)
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Ames 51 sample, 63 percent of the regulated chemicals are synthetic, and 13 percent of the unregulatedchemicals are synthetic. Similarpatternsare displayedin the
Ames 80 group as well. A similarsynthetic
emphasiswith an even higherpercentageof
regulated chemicalsbeing syntheticis captured in the FDA regulationgroup.
Whereasthe syntheticstatusof the chemical plays a pivotalrole in determiningregulatorydecisions,the risklevel does not. The
naturallog of the HERP index is the measure of the risk level that is used. Because
of the role of veryhigh riskoutliers,particularly EDB exposures which have a HERP
value almost an order of magnitudelarger
than the second-largestchemical exposure
examined,the naturallogarithmof the risk
is used to capture the risk level. Somewhat
strikingly, from both the Ames 51 and
Ames 80 group and for Federal regulations
overall and FDA regulations,the ln(HERP
index) has a lower value for the regulated
chemicals than for unregulatedchemicals.
In terms of the risk level, the regulated
chemicalspose a somewhatlower riskusing
this index, whereas they differ considerably
in terms of their syntheticcharacter,as they
are disproportionatelysynthetic.
The breakdown in panels C and D of
Table 1 providesan even more strikingcontrast. For the Ames 51 sample, 24 of the
51 chemicals are synthetic, and for the
Ames 80 sample,31 of the 80 chemicalsare
synthetic.In each instance,over 90 percent
of the syntheticchemicalsare the subjectof
federal regulation,as comparedwith under
half of the nonsynthetic.Moreover,the risks
posed by synthetic chemicals as measured
by the ln(HERP index) are lower for the
synthetic chemicals than for the nonsyntheticchemicals. Similarcontrastis evident in the case of FDA regulations,which
capture a smaller segment of the chemical
groupbut for whichthere is an even greater
relative contrastbetween the syntheticand
nonsynthetic chemicals in terms of the
probabilityof regulation.As in the case of
all chemicals, the risk levels posed by the
synthetic chemicals are a bit less than for
those that are not synthetic.
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OFREGULATION
TABLE2-LOGIT ESTIMATES
COEFFICIENTS
PROBABILITIES,
STANDARD
(ASYMPTOTIC
ERROR)
Ames 51

A.
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Synthetic

2.8*
(1.1)

2.8*
(1.1)
0.005
(0.053)

3.1*
(1.2)

HERP index
Mice die

-1.4
(1.2)

Rats TD50

2.1 x
(3.6 x

10-4
10-4)

1.2x 10-4

MiceTD50

(1.2x
B.

10-4)

Ames 80

Variable

(4)

(5)

(6)

Synthetic

3.3*
(1.1)

3.5*
(1.1)
9.9x 10-3
(79.1 x 10-3)

3.5*
(1.1)

HERP index
Mice die
Rats TD50
Mice TD50

acter of the risk is a drivingforce behind
the probabilityof regulation,controllingfor
the risk level. Although the results differ
somewhat across specifications,overall the
syntheticcharacterof the chemical for this
sample increases the probabilityof regulation by an averageof about one-third.One
would expect for a sample of much less
potent carcinogensthat this influencewould
be less. It is also strikingthat none of the
other risk measures included in the equation is ever statistically significant at the
usual confidence levels. For the range of
variationof riskinessreflected in this sample, it is not the riskposed by the chemicals,
but rather the character of the risk that
seems to be most instrumentalin driving
federal regulatorydecisions.
III. Explaining Regulatory Patterns

-0.4
(0.8)
-
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3.6 x 10-4
(3.9x 10-4)
- 0.6 x 10-4
(1.2x 10-4)

Notes: All equations include an intercept and a dummy
variable for whether rat and mice were tested; equations (1) and (4) include a dummy variable for whether
the rat tests were fatal. The standard errors of these
variables are all larger than the estimated coefficients.
*Coefficients are statistically significant at the 95percent confidence level, two tailed test.

These results also are borne out in more
detailedlogit regressionresultsto assess the
determinantsof the probabilityof government regulation. Each equation includes
characterizationsof the syntheticcharacter
of the risk and a measure of the risk
level-either the HERP index or the TD50
values for rats and mice. Sensitivityanalyses
with a wide variety of risk measures and
functional forms for these risk measures
yielded similarresults. Moreover,these regressions also control for the presence of
test informationwith respect to the different chemicals.
The principalpatterncharacterizedby the
results in Table 2 is that the syntheticchar-

Once government agencies depart from a
framework in which the total net benefits of

regulations become a matter of concern,
there is no assurancethat the overall risk
effects will be captured in the decisions.
Agency practices suggest that there is undue emphasis on the probabilitiesinvolved
ratherthan the populationsexposed.
What this examinationof carcinogenregulation indicatesis that the characterof the
risksis instrumentalas well. For the chemical groups considered,it is not the magnitude of the risk, but rather the synthetic
natureof the risksthat drivesthe regulatory
decision. This type of bias by government
agenciesappearsto be reflectiveof a similar
irrationalityon the part of individualdecisions.

One of the principalanomalies that has
been documentedin the risk-perceptionand
choice-under-uncertaintyliterature is that
individuals tend to overreact to increases
in the risk level. In Viscusi et al. (1987),
we termed this a "reference risk" effect
whereby changes in the risk level from
the accustomed risk will lead to an exaggerated response in terms of the implicit
risk-dollar trade-off reflected in individual
decisions. Focusing on a similarline of argument,WilliamSamuelsonand RichardJ.
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Zeckhauser (1988) term such behavior a
"statusquo bias."
Policies based on the syntheticcharacter
of chemicals embody these kinds of influences. Chemicals that generate hazardous
exposuresbecause they are a naturalpart of
our environmentare much more readilyaccepted than those that are synthetic. One
possible explanationis that there is an implicit judgment on the part of the public
and by governmentagencies that the cost
of eliminatingnatural carcinogensis much
greaterthan the costs associatedwith avoiding synthetic chemicals. However, such explanationsdo not appearto be fully persuasive. For example, the government can
certainlyban peanutbutterso that we could
avoid aflatoxin exposures if we were truly
concerned with risk levels since the major
cost wouldbe forgoinguse of this hazardous
product rather than threatening the wellbeing of the U.S. economy. Moreover, to
the extent that the officialregulatorybiases
have been embodiedin legislationor agency
directives,it is the specificsyntheticcharacter of the chemical that is the pertinent
regulatoryconcern, rather than its linkage
to cost-risk trade-offsor other factors that
might be of greater concern to economists.
These findings suggest that consumers
participating in hypothetical experiments
and students who have responded to the
variouslaboratoryexperimentsare not alone
in their overreaction to increases in the
accustomed risk level. The federal government appearsto have institutionalizedthese
biases in the course of developingits regulation of synthetic chemicals. Whereas the
appropriatetask of the government is to

MAY 1995

alleviatemarketfailures,in this instanceits
principalfunction has been to institutionalize them.
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